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Abstract 
We identify the causal effect of cognitive abilities on economic behavior in an experimental setting. 
Using a forecasting task with varying cognitive load, we identify the causal effect of working 
memory on subjects’ forecasting performance, while  also accounting for the effect of other 
cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics. Addressing the causality is important for 
understanding the nature of various decision-making errors, as well as for providing reliable policy 
implications in contexts such as student placement, personnel assignment, and public policy 
programs designed to augment abilities of the disadvantaged. We further argue that establishing the 
causality of cognitive abilities is a prerequisite for studying their interaction with financial 
incentives, with implications for the design of efficient incentive schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature in economics and psychology has  documented the predictive power of 
cognitive abilities for a variety of outcomes. Individuals with higher scores on various cognitive 
ability tests tend to behave closer to normative game-theoretic solutions (e.g., Burnham et al., 2009; 
Devetag and Warglien, 2003; Rydval et al., 2009); be less prone to behavioral biases and reasoning 
failures (e.g., Ballinger et al., 2011; Oechssler et al., 2009; Stanovich and West, 2000; Toplak et al., 
2011); be less risk averse and time impatient (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2006; Dohmen et al., 2010; 
Frederick, 2005); and have more favorable socioeconomic outcomes (e.g., Cawley et al., 2001; 
Heckman et al., 2006). A parallel literature has shown that a similarly wide range of behavioral and 
socioeconomic outcomes correlate positively with favorable personality traits, most prominently 
with conscientiousness (see Almlund et al., 2011, and Ben-Ner et al., 2008, for reviews). However, 
with few exceptions (e.g., Ballinger et al., 2011; Heckman et al., 2006), the literatures have focused 
on measuring only few cognitive abilities or personality traits, rather than assessing the relative 
predictive power of a broader set of (theoretically relevant) abilities and traits. 
More importantly, as argued in detail by Almlund et al. (2011), the majority of studies have only 
examined the predictive power of abilities and traits rather than their causal effect on outcomes. 
Interpreting  the  correlations is difficult  since outcomes could predict measured individual 
characteristics or vice versa, and both could be caused by other factors. Addressing the reverse 
causality is important for understanding the nature of various decision-making errors, as well as for 
providing reliable policy implications in contexts such as student placement, personnel assignment, 
and public policy programs designed to augment abilities and traits of the disadvantaged. In the 
concluding section, we further argue that establishing the causality of individual characteristics is a 
prerequisite for credibly addressing issues relevant for the design of efficient incentive schemes, 
such as how people behave  under different incentive levels and schemes conditional on their 
characteristics; how they self-select into the schemes based on their characteristics; and whether 
they are aware of their cognitive and personality limitations. 
The causal effect  of cognitive abilities and personality traits on socioeconomic outcomes has 
recently been addressed by labor economists using econometric modeling techniques. One strand of 
the literature uses structural equation methods  that  inevitably invoke debatable theoretical 
assumptions and identifying restrictions pertaining to the reverse causality running from outcomes 
to measured individual characteristics (e.g., Heckman et al., 2006). Another strand, with similar 
caveats, uses dynamic factor modeling to study the formation of abilities and traits over the life 
cycle (e.g., Cunha et al., 2010). Yet another strand is based on rare intervention studies aimed at 
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improving  specific  individual characteristics of the  disadvantaged, usually using random 
assignment to causally attribute the treatment effect of a  policy  intervention  to the associated 
changes in the individual characteristics (e.g., Heckman et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we demonstrate how  one can identify  the  causal  effect of cognitive abilities  on 
economic behavior  in a controlled experimental setting. Drawing  on contemporary cognitive 
psychology, we broadly distinguish between domain-general and task-specific cognitive abilities, 
and we choose domain-general abilities to be represented by working memory – the capacity to 
control attention when executing cognitively complex tasks. Working memory tests are strong and 
robust predictors of general intelligence as well as performance in a broad range of tasks requiring 
maintenance of task-relevant information.  Furthermore, compared to alternative measures of 
intelligence  such as the Beta  III test or the Raven test, working memory seems  more firmly 
established theoretically, neurobiologically and psychometrically. 
We identify the causal effect of working memory on performance in a time-series forecasting task 
consisting  of a deterministic seasonal pattern “masked” by a state variable and an error  term. 
Discovering the seasonal pattern and forecasting accurately requires maintaining forecast-relevant 
information accessible in memory while simultaneously processing it. The task thus “activates” the 
type of cognitive ability that working memory theoretically represents. The causality test relies on 
manipulating the task’s working memory load (or, more generally, the task’s cognitive load). Two 
screens with forecast-relevant  information are presented either simultaneously or sequentially. 
Since the sequential (simultaneous) presentation treatment features higher (lower) working memory 
load, working memory should, ceteris paribus, be a stronger (weaker) determinant of forecasting 
performance. We find this causality hypothesis confirmed for individual differences in asymptotic 
forecasting performance. 
Ceteris paribus refers not only to the fact that other features of the forecasting task are identical for 
both treatments. It also means allowing for the possibility that, besides working memory, other 
cognitive abilities affect  performance.  We  find that short-term memory –  often regarded by 
cognitive psychologists as a task-specific cognitive ability counterpart of working memory – has a 
causal effect on  performance  parallel to that of working memory.  On the other hand, basic 
arithmetic abilities – another task-specific ability – tend to predict performance only in the less 
memory-intensive simultaneous presentation treatment. Since other task-specific cognitive abilities 
such as prior forecasting expertise could be vital for performance but are hard to measure, 
we attempt to minimize their potential relevance by design and implementation features described 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0644 
 
in the next section. Nevertheless, we also obtain a proxy for prior forecasting expertise (or intrinsic 
forecasting ability) and show that controlling for it leaves our results intact. 
We further account for individual heterogeneity in a broad set of personality traits that potentially 
affect forecasting performance. After controlling for the impact of the aforementioned cognitive 
abilities, performance is influenced negatively by math anxiety and, to a weaker extent, positively 
by ex ante intrinsic motivation. Other collected personality and demographic characteristics turn out 
irrelevant for performance. As a last performance determinant, we find that a subset of subjects who 
win a large windfall financial bonus immediately prior to the forecasting task are able to forecast 
better, but this effect occurs only in the more memory-intensive sequential presentation treatment. 
We take further steps towards providing a clear interpretation of the causality of working memory 
and short-term memory. First, a recent literature has argued that performance on cognitive tests is 
affected by various personality traits and economic preference  related mostly to test-taking 
motivation (e.g., Borghans et al., 2008). This issue might be relevant especially since, unlike the 
forecasting task, our  cognitive tests were administered without performance-based financial 
incentives.
1
Second, working memory researchers often study the predictive power of the underlying working 
memory capacity to control attention, namely by removing the variance that working memory 
shares with short-term memory and other cognitive abilities (e.g., Engle et al., 1999). Following the 
practice, we remove the shared variance among working memory, short-term memory and basic 
arithmetic abilities. Doing so further increases the predictive power of working memory and short-
term memory in the sequential presentation treatment and yields the strongest support for their 
causal effect among all model specifications. Importantly, this finding provides confidence that the 
high predictive power of working memory is not due to the shared surface features between the 
working memory test and the forecasting task (such as dealing with simple patterns and arithmetic 
operations), since the influence of the surface features was removed from the working memory 
scores when extracting the underlying capacity to control attention. 
 We find, for instance, that working memory scores are higher for subjects with higher 
perseverance and lower risk aversion. Parsing out these effects increases the predictive power of 
working memory in the sequential presentation treatment and provides stronger support for the 
causality hypothesis. 
                                                 
1 We follow this standard psychology practice partly to avoid the possibility that any relationship found 
between the measured cognitive abilities and forecasting performance is due to them being incentivized in a 
similar manner. 
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Our causality identification approach based on cognitive load manipulation has long been used to 
study the role of working memory in lower-order and higher-order cognitive processes.
2 Typical 
applications have been in the context of elementary attention tasks such as the antisaccade task 
(e.g., Kane et al., 2001) and the Stroop task (e.g., Kane and Engle, 2003). To our knowledge, we 
make a first attempt to employ the identification approach in the context of an economically 
relevant task. More generally, despite the wide-ranging predictive power of working memory in 
tasks studied by psychologists, working memory researchers themselves note almost complete lack 
of studies on the role of working memory in real-world problem-solving “insight” tasks requiring 
their solution to be gradually discovered (Hambrick and Engle, 2003).
3
Note that the identification approach examines whether increasing cognitive load strengthens the 
relationship between task performance and working memory, unlike the literature that studies the 
effect of increasing cognitive load on behavior itself (see, e.g., Duffy and Smith, 2011, for a 
review).
 Since many cognitively 
demanding, individual decision-making tasks in economics are “insight” tasks by their nature, we 
situate the causality test in such a setting. 
4
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the forecasting task and the causality 
identification approach. Section 3 reviews the measured cognitive, personality and demographic 
characteristics and summarizes the  implementation details. Section 4 presents the results, and 
Section 5 discusses their potential extensions and applications. 
 The latter literature can address neither the causality of cognitive abilities nor the role of 
cognitive abilities in general, at least not directly. Increasing cognitive load has been shown to 
produce, for instance, higher risk aversion (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2006), higher impulsiveness (e.g., 
Hinson et al., 2003) and less self control (e.g., Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999), and hence these 
personality effects, rather than ability effects, could lie behind any observed treatment effect of 
cognitive load manipulation. We measure various traits related to impulsiveness and risk attitudes, 
but none of them turn out relevant for forecasting performance. Also, we find only a small and 
insignificant average treatment effect of the cognitive load manipulation on asymptotic forecasting 
performance, regardless of controlling for individual characteristics. 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, the literature has employed latent variable modeling, mainly to examine the relationship 
between working memory and general fluid intelligence (e.g., Kane et al., 2004). 
3 As an exception, Welsh et al. (1999) find working memory to be correlated with performance in the Tower 
of London puzzle. 
4 Another difference between the two approaches is that the former usually manipulates cognitive load within 
the task itself (like we do), whereas the latter manipulates the load by distracting subjects with a secondary 
attention interference task. A related literature manipulates task complexity, usually making more extensive 
task adjustments compared to the cognitive load approaches. See, e.g., Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) for a 
review. 




2.1 Forecasting task 
 
We study individual behavior in a time-series forecasting task. Subjects repeatedly forecast 
a deterministic seasonal process, Ωt, of the following form: 
Ωt = Bt + γ1D1t + γ2D2t + γ3D3t + ηt 
 
Bt ∼ i.i.d. uniform {10, 20, 30, 40} 
D1t=1 if t=1,4,7,…100; 0 otherwise 
D2t=1 if t=2,5,8,…98;   0 otherwise 
D3t=1 if t=3,6,9,…99;   0 otherwise  
γ1 = 46, γ2 = 34, γ3 = 18 
ηt ∼ i.i.d. uniform {-8, -4, 0, 4, 8}  
 
Ωt contains a state variable, Bt, a three-period seasonal pattern, Σs=1,2,3 γsDst, and an additive mean-
zero i.i.d. error term, ηt. In each period t, subjects forecast the value of Ωt+1 based on observing 
eight-period “history windows,” (Bt,…,Bt-7) and (Ωt,…,Ωt-7), on their screen. Subjects also observe 
Bt+1 to be able to forecast Ωt+1. They are told the distribution of Bt and ηt and about the existence of 
the seasonal pattern. Hence discovering the pattern and combining it with the observed values of 
Bt+1 is the key to accurately forecasting Ωt+1. After each forecast, Ft+1, subjects learn their current 
“noisy” forecast error, Ωt+1-Ft+1 (as opposed to the “true” forecast error, Ωt+1-Ft+1-ηt+1, the absolute 
value of which is used to measure forecasting performance). 
Bt and Σs=1,2,3 γsDst account for approximately equal shares of the total variance of Ωt (namely 41% 
and 49%, respectively, with the remaining 10% attributable to ηt). As a consequence, the variability 
of Bt “masks” the seasonal pattern which cannot be inferred from past values of Ωt alone but must 
rather be inferred from the differences between past values of Ωt and Bt. Also, the presence of ηt 
means that subjects can only extract past values of Ωt-Bt = γs+ηt. Hence discovering the seasonal 
parameters, γs, is a gradual, signal extraction task that likely taxes both working memory and short-
term memory. The memory load does not cease entirely even after discovering the seasonal pattern 
since subjects continuously need to keep track of the revolving γs and to combine them with Bt+1 in 
order to form their forecasts of Ωt+1. 
                                                 
5 Additional design and implementation details are contained in the Appendix. The experimental instructions 
are contained in contained in Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-040. 
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A sequence of pilots have indicated three key aspects of the cognitive complexity associated with 
extracting γs from γs+ηt (henceforth Ωt-complexity), namely, the number of values in the support of 
ηt; the degree of “overlap” of the γs+ηt distributions, conditional on γs (i.e., their degree of non-
monotonicity and non-uniqueness relative to each other); and the size of the “history window.” 
Given the forecasting abilities in the student subject pool at hand, the present parameterization of γs 
and ηt has the convenient properties of bounding forecasting performance of a majority of subjects 
away from perfection throughout the task (and hence preserving financial incentives for learning) 
and generating sufficient potentially predictable between-subject variance in forecasting 
performance. 
The character of the forecasting task reflects a consensus among psychologists on the cue-discovery 
nature of human learning in probabilistic environments. Even in the presence of random error, 
people seem proficient at discovering which cues are important (e.g., Dawes, 1979; Klayman 1984, 
1988), as opposed to learning the exact weights attached to a given set of cues, especially correlated 
ones (e.g., Hammond et al., 1980; Brehmer, 1980). These findings have been largely confirmed by 
the time-series forecasting and expectation formation literatures: subjects are generally not good 
intuitive forecasters when it comes to determining parameter values of stochastic time series with 
even simple autoregressive or moving-average components (e.g., Hey, 1994; Maines and Hand, 
1996); by contrast, subjects are good at detecting recognizable patterns in even relatively complex 
real-world time series (e.g., Lawrence and O’Connor, 2005). Thus our subjects should generally be 
capable of discovering the deterministic seasonal pattern even in the presence of randomness, ηt, 
but we challenge them further by introducing the state variable, Bt, that raises the memory load. 
The time-series forecasting literature further documents that when the nature of the forecasted 
process permits so – for example, when the time series contains correlated past values or a trending 
component or both –  subjects tend to employ various “natural” simplifying heuristics of the 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) kind. They almost invariably anchor their forecasts on the most 
recent past value of the forecasted process and adjust it either for a previous trend (extrapolation 
heuristic), or for a long-term average (averaging heuristic), or for their previous forecast error(s) 
(exponential smoothing heuristic). These simplifying heuristics make forecasting strategies appear 
boundedly rational and ultimately reduce the overall memory load of forecasting tasks (e.g., Harvey 
et al., 1994; Hey, 1994). By choosing the forecasting process with a deterministic seasonal pattern, 
relatively high variance of Bt, and no trending component, we intentionally curb the effectiveness of 
the heuristics and create substantial opportunity cost to their use, as illustrated later for a specific 
averaging heuristic that we call a mechanical forecasting algorithm. 
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The fact that subjects know the distribution of Bt and ηt, combined with the detailed, example-
oriented task instructions, make the forecasting task a logical rather than a statistical forward 
induction problem. This is meant to a priori minimize the influence of  task-specific cognitive 
abilities that accrue  from prior forecasting expertise. Prior expertise, or domain knowledge,  is 
usually an important form of task-specific cognitive abilities,
6 but individual differences therein are 
hard to measure, so suppressing their potential importance seems desirable given our primary focus 
on the causal effect of general cognitive abilities.  Another sense in which the impact of prior 
expertise is minimized is that forecasting performance is measured “asymptotically” after on-task 
learning has ceased. Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that  on-task learning, or 
experience, tends to be the most productive task-specific cognitive ability which often overrides the 
influence of prior expertise.
7
2.2 Causality identification approach 
 It is nevertheless still possible that some form of “intrinsic forecasting 
ability”  –  such as pattern recognition skills in the presence  of randomness –  matters in our 
forecasting task, and that this ability is not well captured by the measured individual characteristics. 
In Section 4, we address this issue by obtaining a proxy for intrinsic forecasting ability. In Section 
5, we propose how one could explicitly examine the effect of prior expertise.  
The experimental design consists of two between-subject treatments that vary in their working 
memory load, and likely also in their short-term memory load. In the treatment with higher memory 
load, Tseq, the two screens with the values of (Bt+1,…,Bt-7) and (Ωt,…,Ωt-7), respectively, are in each 
period t displayed sequentially. By contrast, in the treatment with lower memory load, Tsim, the two 
screens are displayed simultaneously.
8
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, since Tseq features higher working memory load compared 
to Tsim, working memory has a stronger positive impact on forecasting performance in 
Tseq compared to Tsim. 
 The treatment variation permits identifying the causal effect 
of working memory on forecasting performance by testing the following causality hypothesis: 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Anderson (2000), Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and Libby and Luft (1993) for reviews. As noted, 
e.g., by Camerer and Hogarth (1999), prior expertise seems only imperfectly transferable across even slightly 
different cognitive production settings. 
7 See, e.g., Anderson (2000), Ericsson and Smith (1991), and Reber (1989). The findings in experimental 
economics seem less conclusive (see, e.g., Kagel and Levine, 1986, and the ensuing debate). 
8 In Tsim, subjects observe the two parallel screens for 15 seconds. In Tseq, subjects observe the (Bt+1,…,Bt-7) 
screen for 10 seconds and subsequently the (Ωt,…,Ωt-7) screen for 15 seconds. The working memory 
literature illustrates that (sensible) time constraints, and, more generally, individual differences in effort 
duration, are inconsequential for the relationship between working memory and cognitive performance (e.g., 
Engle and Kane, 2004; Heitz et al., 2008). 
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To see the difference in the memory load between Tseq and Tsim, recall that in order to extract the 
seasonal pattern, subjects need to attend to the differences between past values of Ωt and Bt. Doing 
so is more memory-intensive in Tseq where past Ωt-Bt values must be calculated virtually, leaving 
less scarce memory resources for extracting the seasonal pattern. By contrast, subjects in Tsim can 
calculate past Ωt-Bt values visually from the simultaneously presented (Bt+1,…,Bt-7) and (Ωt,…,Ωt-7) 
screens. Hence Tsim supplies “external memory” for the calculation of past Ωt-Bt values, which 
relaxes the memory load of  the calculation and leaves more memory resources for the actual 
extraction of the seasonal pattern.  
The cognitive load imposed in Tseq closely matches the aspects of cognition theoretically underlying 
the working memory construct, namely maintenance of relevant information in active memory, 
resolution of conflicting information, and controlled allocation of attention (Engle and Kane, 2004). 
Forecasting in Tseq predominantly requires the use of System 2 (controlled processing) type of 
cognitive ability, of which working memory is a fundamental component. On the other hand, 
forecasting in Tsim is likely to pose a much more reflexive, pattern-recognition exercise requiring 
mostly the use of System 1 (automated processing) type of cognitive ability (e.g., Feldman-Barrett 
et al., 2004; Stanovich and West, 2000). 
2.3 Forecasting sequences and payoff function 
The forecasting sequences, Ωt, vary across subjects but are not generated completely at random. In 
order to retain basic control over the influence of Ωt-complexity on between-subject variance in 
performance, only the ηt streams vary across subjects,
9
We measure performance in a couple of twelve-period segments of the forecasting task, namely in 
the EARLY periods 21-32 and the LATE periods 84-95. For each subject, the EARLY and LATE 
segments of Ωt as well as the eight periods preceding them are exactly matched in terms of all the 
Ωt components on a period-by-period basis. Each subject thus forecasts the same segment of his or 
 and these are representative in terms of 
several theoretically relevant aspects of Ωt-complexity (see the Appendix for details). Further, to 
obtain “cleaner” across-treatment comparisons of performance and its determinants, we use the 
same set of Ωt sequences in both treatments. As detailed in Section 4.3, we then remove the impact 
of Ωt-complexity by comparing performance of the pairs of subjects facing identical Ωt sequences 
across treatments. 
                                                 
9 For all subjects, Bt consists of the same sequence of permutations on the support of Bt. The permutations 
are selected and adjoined in such a way as to avoid repeating values and easily memorable sequences. 
Further, each Bt value is paired with each value of the seasonal pattern approximately equally often. 
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her Ωt sequence twice, based on observing the same forecast-relevant information.
10
The payoff function in the forecasting task has the form of a betting scheme. At the very beginning 
of each period, i.e., prior to observing the screens with forecast-relevant information, subjects are 
asked to bet an amount xt on their forecast, Ft+1. They can bet up to 100 ECU, but at least 50 ECU 
so that they always have sufficient financial incentives to forecast accurately. The payoff (in ECU) 
in period t, πt, then depends on the “noisy” absolute forecast error, abs(Ωt+1-Ft+1), as well as on the 
amount bet, xt: 
 One advantage 
of this design feature is that a comparison of each subject’s EARLY and LATE performance yields 
an unambiguous within-subject measure of learning. Another advantage is that the correlation 
between EARLY and LATE performance provides a useful indicator of the internal reliability of the 
chosen forecasting performance measure. Finally, we will argue that residual variation in EARLY 
performance (after parsing out the influence of individual characteristic) serves as an efficient proxy 
for prior forecasting expertise in the estimated model of LATE performance. 
πt = xtθgt + (1-θ)(100-xt) 
where gt = max{20 - abs(Ωt+1-Ft+1),0}, 50 ≤ xt ≤ 100, and θ=0.1 
 
Hence the return to betting, θgt, is a negative linear function of the “noisy” absolute forecast error, 
as long as the forecast error does not exceed 20 whereby the return to betting becomes zero. On the 
other hand, every ECU not bet earns a riskless return of (1−θ). Clearly, betting xt>50 is profitable 
only if gt>(1-θ)/θ, i.e., only if abs(Ωt+1-Ft+1)<11. The net gain from betting xt>50 hence becomes 
positive only if subjects manage to reduce their “noisy” absolute forecast errors below 11 on 
average. 
The parameterization of the payoff function is conveniently linked with the parameterization of the 
Ωt process. To see this, consider forecasting performance of a mechanical forecasting algorithm 
that, instead of focusing on extracting the seasonal pattern, forms its point forecast simply by 
adding Bt+1 to the average of the three most recent past values of Ωt-Bt. The mean “noisy” absolute 
                                                 
10 Reflecting findings from pilots, EARLY performance is measured sufficiently after the beginning of the 
forecasting task to ensure task salience. LATE performance is measured as much apart from EARLY 
performance as possible but sufficiently away from the end of the task so that LATE performance is not 
affected by lapses of concentration. We find it highly unlikely (and there is no evidence in the debriefing 
questionnaire) that subjects would recognize the repeated part of the Ωt sequence after more than 60 periods. 
This is especially due to the stationary nature of Ωt, implying that the EARLY and LATE segments do not 
differ in an easily recognizable manner from other Ωt realizations. Nevertheless, we checked that when 
performance is instead measured in the twelve periods directly preceding the LATE segment, the results of 
the multivariate analysis presented in Section 4.3 qualitatively hold. 
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forecast error of the algorithm is about  11.3 on average (varying slightly across different  Ωt 
sequences; the mean true  absolute forecast error is about 10.3).  Hence to find betting  xt>50 
profitable, subjects must perform better than the mechanical forecasting algorithm: they must 
attempt to discover the seasonal pattern. 
One reason we make subjects bet on their forecasts is to keep the relatively lengthy forecasting task 
intellectually stimulating throughout. As discussed in the concluding section, another reason is to 
obtain a decision-relevant, incentive-compatible measure of confidence in forecasting abilities, and 
to analyze how this confidence influences forecasting performance. A detailed analysis of betting 
behavior is not the subject of this paper. Nevertheless, to show that subjects’ incentives to forecast 
accurately were comparable across treatments, note that in the LATE segment for which we mostly 
analyze performance, the average bet is 85.8 ECU and is only marginally higher in Tsim by 6% 
(p=0.097). In fact, 44% of subjects in Tsim and 35% in Tseq bet the maximum of 100ECU throughout 
the LATE segment and only 15% in Tsim and 25% in Tseq bet less than 70 ECU on average. In the 
EARLY segment, subjects bet considerably less, namely 68.4 ECU on average, and their bets are on 
average higher in Tsim by a larger margin of 14% (p=0.002).
11
3. Measured individual characteristics and implementation details 
 Still, all subjects of course bet at least 
the required 50 ECU. 
3.1 Cognitive abilities 
We measure working memory by a working memory span test, namely a computerized version of 
the “operation span” test (Turner and Engle, 1989). The test requires memorizing sequences (of 
various lengths) of briefly presented letters interrupted by solving simple arithmetic problems (i.e., 
by an attention interference task).
12 At the end of a sequence, subjects recall as many letters as 
possible in the correct positions in the sequence. The working memory score is the number of 
correctly recalled letters summed across all sequences.
13
Working memory constitutes theoretically and neurobiologically a well-defined  domain-general 
cognitive ability,  representing the capacity to  control  attention  (e.g., Engle and Kane, 2004). 
Working memory span tests have strong internal reliability (e.g., Conway et al., 2005). They predict 
 
                                                 
11 The across-treatment comparison of bets is performed using the paired two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
pairing subjects with identical Ωt sequences in Tsim and Tseq. 
12 Subjects determine, in a true-false manner, whether equations such as “(9/3)-2=2?” are solved correctly. In 
an initial practice period, the computer measures each subject’s equation-solving speed and subsequently 
requires the subject to maintain the speed throughout the test while also maintaining solution accuracy. 
13 Alternative scoring procedures are described in Conway et al. (2005). 
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performance in general fluid intelligence tests as well as in a broad range of lower- and higher-order 
cognitive tasks requiring controlled (as opposed to automated) information processing, such as  
reading comprehension, abstract reasoning, problem solving,  and complex learning   (see,  e.g., 
Feldman-Barrett et al., 2004). Ackerman et al. (2002) suggest that working memory span tests are 
both theoretically and psychometrically superior to alternative, potentially broader tests of general 
intelligence such as the Beta III test (Kellogg and Morten, 1999) or the Raven test (Raven et al., 
1998).
14
We measure short-term memory  by a computerized auditory “digit span” test, similar to the 
Wechsler digit span test (e.g., Devetag and Warglien, 2003). The test requires memorizing pseudo-
random sequences (of various lengths) of briefly presented digits and recalling them in the correct 
position in the sequence. The short-term memory score is the number of recalled digits summed 
across all sequences.
  Kane et al. (2004) argue that, in trying to understand the effect of general cognitive 
abilities on behavior, one ought to start with exploring rather reductionist measures such as working 
memory, preferring clarity of interpretation over breadth of measurement. We follow this approach. 
15
Short-term memory (simple) span  tests  such as ours are thought to reflect information storage 
capacity as well as information coding and rehearsal skills that make the stored information better 
memorable (e.g., Engle et al., 1999). Such coding and rehearsal strategies are assumed to be 
eliminated from working memory span tests through the presence of an attention interference task, 
which in turn is the only differentiating design feature ensuring that the working and short-term 
memory span tests measure separate cognitive constructs. In our forecasting setting, better short-
term memory might, for instance, increase the number of past Ωt-Bt values that subjects are able to 
calculate, especially in Tseq where past Ωt and Bt values appear on separate screens. The working 
memory literature extensively documents that short-term memory is a more task-specific (rather 
than domain-general) cognitive ability, in that it is not as strongly related to general intelligence and 
to performance in tasks requiring controlled information processing as is working memory.
 
16
                                                 
14 In Ballinger et al. (2011), both working memory and Beta III (namely its two analytical components) are 
positively correlated with performance in a precautionary saving task. 
 In 
fact, the literature usually views working memory and short-term memory as comprising a 
functional working memory system, with working memory being the central component 
representing the capacity to control attention and short-term memory being the supporting storage, 
coding and rehearsal component (e.g., Kane et al., 2004; Heitz et al., 2005). 
15  From several alternative scoring procedures, we use the one that is most directly comparable to the 
working memory test scoring procedure. 
16 This is particularly true if short-term memory is measured by verbal or numerical tests. Spatial tests have 
more general predictive power (e.g., Kane et al., 2004). 
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As  another  potentially relevant cognitive ability,  we  measure basic  math  abilities under time 
pressure. We administer an “addition and subtraction” test with 60 items and a two-minute time 
limit. The test sheet has alternating rows of 2-digit additions and subtractions, such as “25+29=__” 
or “96–24=__.” The math score is the total count of correct answers.
17
Our math test belongs to the class of basic arithmetic ability tests provided by the “ETS Kit of 
Referenced Tests for Cognitive Factors” (Ekstrom et al., 1976). The tests are assumed to measure 
the ability to perform basic arithmetic operations with speed and accuracy but are not meant to 
capture mathematical reasoning or higher mathematical skills. The test closely matches the basic 
arithmetic skills required in the forecasting task and hence can be regarded as another task-specific 
cognitive ability measure. While we have no strong priors as regards the relative impact of basic 
arithmetic  abilities on forecasting performance across treatments, the impact is  likely to be 




3.2 Personality traits and demographic characteristics 
 
The personality traits described below are measured as potential correlates of forecasting 
performance and cognitive abilities. Also, as mentioned below, some of the personality traits 
correlate with each other, so measuring them separately seems desirable for disentangling their 
impact. Each personality trait is measured by a ”personality scale” consisting of a collection of 
statements.
  Subjects indicate their agreement or disagreement with each of the statements as 
follows: 1 = “entirely true,” 2 = “mostly true,” 3 = “mostly false” and 4 = “entirely false.” Subjects 
are told that there are “neither good nor bad choices” and are asked to make choices most closely 
reflecting their attitudes and behavior. Since both positively and negatively worded statements are 
included, the choices for negatively worded statements are recoded  (with one exception noted 
below). Each subject’s score is the average of his or her choices. All the personality scales are 
included in a single sheet and subjects encounter the various statements (10-12 per scale) in a 
randomized order identical across subjects. 
                                                 
17 The test in fact had two parts containing different items, separated by a couple of other tasks that took 15-
20 minutes. The test-retest reliability of the math score, as measured by the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the two test scores, is 0.854. 
18 One may further wish to measure perceptual speed abilities as these apparently matter for basic encoding 
and comparison of items under time pressure (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2002). Nevertheless, complex perceptual 
speed test scores and working memory span test scores share substantial variance, and the causality appears 
to run from working memory to perceptual abilities rather than vice versa (e.g., Heitz et al., 2005). 
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We measure intrinsic motivation by a scale called need for cognition, a well-established measure of 
one’s motivation to engage in effortful, cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1996).
19 
Need for cognition is closely connected with conscientiousness – a personality trait from the well-
known “Big Five” trait inventory – which has been documented as the most prominent predictor of 
behavioral and socioeconomic outcomes (e.g., Almlund et al., 2011).
20
The math anxiety scale (e.g., Pajares and Urdan, 1996) measures anxiety or feelings of tension 
when manipulating numbers or solving of math problems. For this scale only, we recode the choices 
for positively worded statements so that a high score means high math anxiety. Anxiety to deal with 
numbers (under time pressure) could affect forecasting performance as well as performance on the 
cognitive tests. In fact, math anxiety has been found correlated with mathematics achievement, 
aptitude and schooling grades (e.g., Pajares and Miller, 1994; Schwarzer et al., 1989), and it is 
closely related to other math-related psychological constructs such as math self-efficacy and math 
self-concept (e.g., Cooper and Robinson, 1991; Pajares and Miller, 1994).  
 There is an extensive but 
inconclusive literature in economics, psychology and neuroscience on the channels through which 
financial incentives could interact with (e.g., crowd-out) intrinsic motivation in stimulating effort 
and performance (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2000; Murayama et al, 2010; McDaniel and Rutström, 2001). Not directly addressing the complex 
interactions, we include intrinsic motivation in the empirical model of forecasting performance in 
a reduced-form manner to account for the possibility that  subjects are ex ante  differentially 
motivated to perform well, especially in the more cognitively demanding Tseq treatment. 
We also use three scales of Whiteside and Lynam (2001) that are meant to measure various aspects 
of impulsive behavior.
21
                                                 
19 As in Ballinger et al. (2011), we use a short version of the need for cognition scale of Cacioppo et al. 
(1984). Ballinger et al. (2011) find need for cognition to be positively correlated with performance in their 
precautionary saving task, but the relationship vanishes once the impact of cognitive abilities is taken into 
account. 
 Impulsiveness might matter in our context since Hinson et al. (2003) find it 
to be more prominent under higher cognitive load. More specifically, the sensation-seeking scale is 
a broad proxy for risk-taking attitude, which might affect subjects’ willingness to experiment with 
alternative forecasting strategies, for instance with alternative approaches to discovering the 
seasonal pattern. Sensation-seeking has been found positively correlated with need for cognition 
(e.g., Crowley and Hoyer, 1989) and risk-taking behavior (e.g., Eckel and Wilson, 2004). The 
premeditation scale is a proxy for one’s propensity to pause and think carefully while carrying out 
20 Conscientiousness is viewed as the tendency to be organized, responsible, dependable, hardworking and 
persistent. 
21 Ballinger et al. (2011) find that, of the three impulsiveness scales, only perseverance predicts performance 
in a precautionary saving task, but its effect is unexpectedly negative. 
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(cognitive) tasks, which might be relevant for forming successful forecasting strategies, possibly 
complementing sensation-seeking.  Lastly,  the  perseverance  scale is thought to measures one’s 
determination in solving lengthy and demanding tasks, which might matter since our key measure 
of forecasting performance is situated towards the end of the rather lengthy task. 
We further measure judgmental confidence, or trust in one’s judgment, by a short version of the 
Judgmental Self-Doubt Scale (Mirels et al., 2002). The authors show that the scale is positively 
correlated, for instance, with need for cognition, as well as with self-esteem and locus of control 
which both have been found associated with a variety of behavioral and socioeconomic outcomes 
(see, e.g., Almlund et al., 2011).  Higher judgmental confidence is also associated with lower 
anxiety,  causal uncertainty,  discomfort with ambiguity and preference for predictability, all of 
which could affect forecasting performance given the stochastic  features  of the task. We also 
measure judgmental confidence as a likely determinant of betting behavior. 
In addition to  the above personality scales, we  also measure  subjects’  risk  aversion  using a 
hypothetical risk elicitation task of the Holt and Laury (2002) format.
22
In a short questionnaire, we further collected demographic variables, namely age, gender and 
university field of study. The questionnaire also collected proxies for socioeconomic status, namely 
the number of household members and functional cars in the household in the last year of high 
school, and a binary indicator of one’s current personal car ownership. None of the socioeconomic 
variables turn out important in the analysis below. 
 While risk aversion should 
not theoretically influence forecasting decisions per se since they are risk-free in economic sense, 
risk attitudes could affect the formation of forecasting strategies, as hypothesized above for 
sensation-seeking. Especially if sensation-seeking turns out important for forecasting behavior, one 
may wish to have a proxy for risk attitudes as usually measured by economists. Furthermore, there 
is also growing evidence that people with higher cognitive abilities tend to be less risk averse (e.g., 
Dohmen et al., 2010), so risk aversion could be negatively  correlated especially with  working 
memory. 
                                                 
22 The risk elicitation task has six “multiple price lists”, each consisting of 11 ordered risky choice pairs. 
Subjects draw a horizontal line to indicate their willingness to switch from a fixed sure payoff to an 
increasingly attractive gamble. The risk aversion score is constructed as the summation of the line locations. 
The risk elicitation task in fact hat two identical parts separated by a couple of unrelated tasks that took 15-
20 minutes. The test-retest reliability of the risk aversion measure, as indicated by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the two test scores, is 0.932. Although the results of hypothetical and incentivized risk 
elicitation may differ (e.g., Harrison and Rutström 2008), we prefer to collect all the cognitive and 
personality characteristics in the same, non-incentivized manner. 
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Lastly, right after completing the collection of individual characteristics, subjects had a chance to 
win a substantial financial bonus, later referred to as windfall because it was awarded exogenously 
with respect to the forecasting task.
23
3.3 Implementation details 
 The bonus affected 14 (out of 124) subjects and amounted to 
750CZK for 13 subjects and 1500CZK (approximately PPP$117) for the remaining one.  The 
incidence of the bonus was balanced across treatments: eight bonuses were awarded to subjects in 
Tseq.  We  have no strong  priors as to whether the bonus ought to foster or discourage  ex ante 
intrinsic motivation to forecast well, and how the bonus interacts with the high-powered financial 
incentives implemented in the forecasting task itself. The bonus could induce positive affect, which 
has been shown to foster flexible thinking and problem solving and enhance performance even in 
difficult, complex tasks (see, e.g., Isen, 2000, for a review). Isen and Reeve (2006) further argue 
that positive affect fosters intrinsic motivation, performance on enjoyable tasks, and responsible 
work behavior on uninteresting tasks. 
The experiment was conducted at the Bank Austria Portable Experimental Laboratory at CERGE-
EI, Prague. The subjects were 124 full-time native Czech students from Prague universities and 
colleges, namely the University of Economics, Czech Technical University, Charles University, and 
Anglo-American College, with the majority of subjects recruited from the first two universities.
24
Experimental sessions lasted approximately 4 hours on average, but no longer than 4.5 hours. The 
collection of individual characteristics in the first part of each session usually lasted 1.5-2 hours. 
The order of collection was the same across sessions, with the cognitive tests generally preceding 
the personality scales and the demographic questionnaire. For the completion, subjects earned a 
participation fee of 150 CZK (approximately PPP$12) and could win the windfall financial bonus. 
The working memory and short-term memory tests were conducted using E-prime (Schneider et al., 
2002) while the remaining collection was administered in a paper-and-pencil format. 
 
The treatments were balanced in terms of gender (32 and 34 males in Tsim and Tseq, respectively). 
After a short break, the forecasting task, programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), 
lasted about two hours and was completed at each subject’s individual pace. All periods were paid 
and subjects could earn over 900CZK (approximately PPP$70). The actual average earnings across 
both treatments were 483CZK (approximately PPP$38). Thus together with the participation fee, 
                                                 
23 In each experimental session, we conducted a short guessing game experiment from which 2-3 randomly 
selected subjects won the bonus, the size of which depended on their choice in the game and the number of 
winners. The possibility of winning the bonus was pre-announced in the initial instructions. 
24 Further information on the subject pool and recruitment procedures is contained in the Appendix. 
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subjects walked out with PPP$50 on average (not counting the windfall financial bonus). After 
completing a debriefing questionnaire, subjects were paid off privately in cash. All parts of the 
experiment were conducted anonymously (subjects had a unique ID that they kept throughout the 
experiment). 
4. Results 
4.1 Forecasting performance 
As mentioned earlier, subject i’s forecasting performance in period t is measured in terms of his or 
her “true” absolute forecast error, abs(Ωi,t+1-Fi,t+1-ηi,t+1), henceforth  “forecast error” unless 
otherwise noted. Let Mi,t denote subject i’s twelve-period moving average of forecast errors up to 
period t. Figure 1 displays the evolution of average Mi,t in each treatment. Average performance is 
clearly better in the less memory-intensive simultaneous presentation treatment, Tsim. The difference 
relative to Tseq – and thus the average treatment effect of the memory load manipulation – becomes 
smaller over time. There is a considerable extent of learning, especially in the first half of the task. 
In both treatments, average Mi,t about halves throughout the task. The evolution of performance can 
be judged relative to the benchmark of the above mentioned mechanical forecasting algorithm with 
the mean true absolute forecast error of about 10.3. In both treatments, average Mi,t gradually falls 
below the benchmark, though more than twice faster in Tsim. In Tseq, average Mi,t starts much further 
above the benchmark and takes around 40 forecasting periods to reach it.
25
Since the forthcoming analysis focuses on explaining performance heterogeneity, Figure 1 shows 
the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of Mi,t to illustrate that both treatments generate plenty of potentially 
predictable between-subject variance throughout the task. The worst forecasters perform similarly 
in both treatments, whereas the best forecasters consistently perform better in the less memory-
intensive Tsim treatment. In both treatment, even the worst forecasters show some learning progress, 
and even the best forecasters always have financial incentive to improve performance and do so. As 
an exception, a small fraction of subjects in both treatments reach the performance ceiling (slightly 
more often in Tsim), which might reduce the extent of between-subject performance variability and 
attenuate  the predictive power of individual characteristics.  This  concern  is addressed in the 
multivariate analysis below and turns out to be of minor importance. 
 
An additional source of performance heterogeneity not apparent from Figure 1 is the seasonal 
nature of the forecasting task. Performance varies across the three forecasting seasons, with the 
                                                 
25 Recall that subjects make their first forecast in period 8. 
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“sandwich” seasonal parameter, γ2 = 34, usually being associated with markedly lower and less 
variable forecast errors. The forecasting seasons feature various degrees of “overlap” of the γs+ηt 
distributions, conditional on γs, which seems to affect the relative ease of discovering the seasonal 
parameters,  γs. While a more detailed seasonal analysis is possible, a potential caveat is that 
(unobserved)  heterogeneity in subjects’ forecasting strategies may imply different  seasonal 
performance tradeoffs and in turn limit  interpretability of the results. Hence  we adopt a more 
conservative approach by aggregating performance across seasons. 
To look closer at the across-treatment differentials in performance as well as the extent of learning, 
we focus on performance in the perfectly matched EARLY and LATE twelve-period segments, 
namely Mi,31≡Mi,EARLY and Mi,94≡Mi,LATE, respectively (we drop the i subscript whenever the context 
is clear). Confirming the general observations from Figure 1, the average MEARLY is significantly 
lower in Tsim at 10.04 compared to 13.58 in Tseq (p=0.002).
26 The average MLATE is also lower in 
Tsim  at 5.81 compared to 6.93 in Tseq, but the difference is insignificant  (p=0.249).  Learning, 
measured as Mi,EARLY-Mi,LATE, is considerable and significant at p<0.001 in either treatment, but its 
extent is significantly greater in Tseq (p=0.020), mainly due to the higher MEARLY in that treatment.
27
Despite the considerable distance between their measurement, MEARLY  and MLATE  are strongly 
correlated with each other, the Spearman rank correlations reaching 0.726 (p<0.001) in Tsim and 
0.450 (p<0.001) in Tseq (the corresponding Pearson correlations are almost identical). Especially the 
former correlation suggests strong internal reliability of our measure of forecasting performance, 
with implications for testing the causality hypothesis. Namely, if working memory indeed turns out 
to be a stronger predictor of performance in Tseq compared to Tsim, this is unlikely caused by lower 
internal reliability of the performance measure in Tsim but rather due to the causal effect of working 
memory on performance. 
 
In testing the causality hypothesis, we focus on MLATE, which can be regarded as “asymptotic” 
performance  in the sense that learning has ceased. In particular, Mi,LATE  does not differ from 
performance in the previous twelve-period segment, Mi,82, in either treatment (p=0.392 in Tsim, 
p=0.997 in Tseq).
28
                                                 
26 All statistical comparisons in this section are conducted using the paired two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test. Across-treatment comparisons pair subjects with identical Ωt sequences in Tsim and Tseq. The results are 
qualitatively confirmed by the paired t-test as well as corresponding unpaired tests. 
 As a robust alternative to MLATE, free of occasional performance “slip-ups”, we 
27 To get a perspective on the extent of learning, the average Mi,EARLY-Mi,LATE (4.24 in Tsim, 6.65 in Tseq) is 
comparable in magnitude to its standard deviation (4.18 in Tsim, 5.59 in Tseq) as well as the standard deviation 
of MEARLY (5.87 in Tsim, 5.54 in Tseq) and MLATE (5.36 in Tsim, 5.43 in Tseq) themselves. 
28 On the other hand, Mi,82 significantly differs from Mi,70 in both treatments (p=0.032 in Tsim, p<0.001 in 
Tseq). 
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further consider another performance measure based on the average of seasonal medians of forecast 
errors in the LATE segment. Since the two measures are almost perfectly correlated and the results 
are nearly identical for both of them, we present the results only for MLATE.
29
4.2 Bivariate relationships between performance and individual characteristics 
 
We first briefly summarize the collected cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics. 
None of them differ significantly across treatments at p<0.1 using the unpaired two-tail Wilcoxon 
ranksum test and t-test.
30 As detailed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the treatments are, for instance, 
balanced in terms of gender and the incidence of the windfall bonus. All the characteristics have 
considerable variability that does not differ significantly across treatments at p<0.1 using the two-
tail F-test.
31
Table 1 displays Spearman rank correlations between subjects’ forecasting performance and their 
cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics for Tsim and Tseq. The correlation between 
MLATE  and Working memory is strong at -0.479  in Tseq  compared to the much lower and 
insignificant correlation of -0.109  in Tsim. Hence in line with the causality hypothesis, higher 
working memory is stronger associated with better performance when the memory load is higher. In 
the next section, we confirm this conclusion when other potential predictors of MLATE are taken into 
account. To that end, Table 1 shows that MLATE in Tseq is also negatively correlated with Short-term 
memory and Math, though only about half the magnitude compared to the correlation of MLATE with 
Working memory. MLATE also improves with higher Premeditation and lower Math anxiety in Tsim, 
and is better for males in Tseq. However, the gender effect vanishes in the multivariate analysis. 
 
Building on a recent literature (e.g., Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2008; Segal, 2008), we 
next parse out the influence of personality traits from the cognitive test scores. Working memory is 
higher for subjects with higher Perseverance and lower Risk aversion. The partial correlations – i.e., 
standardized regression coefficients from a OLS regression of Working memory on Perseverance 
                                                 
29 The same holds for an analogously constructed robust alternative to MEARLY. One might actually not wish 
to remove performance slip-ups if they arise from momentary distraction related to individual differences in 
working memory. 
30 As an exception, Working memory is marginally higher in Tsim by the ranksum test (p=0.081) but not by 
the t-test (p=0.458). 
31 As an exception, Short-term memory is more variable in Tsim (p<0.001) due to an outlier at the bottom 
performance end, the exclusion of which has no effect on any of the reported results. Potentially slightly 
attenuating the predictive power of individual characteristics, the maximum score is reached by four subjects 
for Working memory (two per treatment), one for Sensation-seeking, and one for Math anxiety. The 
minimum score is reached by one subject for Risk aversion and four for Math anxiety. 
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and Risk aversion in the pooled sample – are 0.189 (p=0.048) and -0.122 (p=0.104), respectively.
32 
Perseverance  could  capture certain aspects of test-taking motivation,
33
Analogous to above, we find that Short-term memory is not significantly related at p<0.1 to any 
personality or demographic variables. On the other hand, Math is higher for males with lower Risk 
aversion and females with lower Math anxiety; the partial correlations obtained  from  a  OLS 
regression accounting  for  these gender interactions  are  -0.330  (p=0.006) and -0.367  (p<0.001), 
respectively.
  while  the  Risk  aversion 
correlation is in line with the aforementioned literature documenting that more intelligent people 
tend to be less risk averse. We call the residuals from the above regression WMresid1. Table 1 
shows that, in Tseq, WMresid1 correlates with MLATE as strongly as does Working memory itself; 
the corresponding correlation in Tsim is now even smaller. 
34 While the impact of Math anxiety is anticipated, it is interesting to establish it only 
for females. The Risk aversion correlation resembles the finding of Dave et al. (2010) obtained for a 
broader measure of mathematical abilities and for both genders.
35
To examine the separate predictive power of the underlying working memory capacity to control 
attention, we extend the above Working memory estimation by parsing out the shared variance with 
Short-term memory and Math,  as well as any statistically significant personality variables.
 We call the residuals from the 
above regression MATHresid1. Table 1 shows that MATHresid1 correlates with MLATE slightly 
weaker than does Math. 
36
                                                 
32 Although the Working memory score reaches the maximum for two subjects in each treatment, we report 
OLS results as these are virtually identical to those obtained from a censored-type estimation. In the 
estimations reported in this section, p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Personality and demographic variables that are not included in the estimations (as well as any interactions 
and higher-order moments) are individually and jointly highly insignificant. The reported correlations are 
Spearman rank correlations. 
 
Namely, the partial correlation coefficients are 0.399 (p<0.001) for Short-term memory and 0.133 
33 Need for cognition turns out highly insignificant, broadly in line with evidence suggesting that working 
memory scores are not correlated with cognitive effort exerted during the tests (e.g., Heitz et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, Need for cognition is highly correlated with both Perseverance (0.237, p=0.008) and Risk 
aversion (-0.301, p<0.001). 
34 The listed coefficients pertain to males and females, respectively, while the corresponding coefficients for 
the other gender are close to zero and highly insignificant. Both the gender interactions are significant at 
p<0.05, whereas the gender dummy is highly insignificant and hence omitted. Math is also significantly 
lower at p<0.1 for older subjects, but Age is not included in the final estimation as we see no theoretical 
justification for parsing it out from Math. 
35 Both Risk aversion and Math anxiety are negatively correlated with Need for cognition (at p<0.01) and 
Perseverance (at p<0.1), both of which proxy for motivation but are insignificant when included in the 
estimation. 
36 Approaches to extracting the capacity to control attention vary. Depending on the research goal, either the 
shared or the residual variance between working memory and short-term memory is parsed out (e.g., Engle et 
al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004). We adopt an approach that most closely corresponds to the way in which we 
parse out personality variables. 
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(p=0.099) for Math, while also controlling for the positive effect of Perseverance and negative 
effects of Risk aversion and Need for cognition.
37
Analogously, we further parse out the effects of Working memory, Premeditation and Judgmental 
confidence from the Short-term memory score.
 We call the residuals from the above regression 
WMresid2. Table 1 shows that, relative to Working memory and WMresid1, WMresid2 correlates 
with MLATE weaker but still highly significantly in Tseq; the corresponding correlation in Tsim is 
again negligible. 
38  Table 1 shows that the regression  residuals, 
STMresid2, are  uncorrelated with MLATE  in either treatment. This suggests that the significant 
correlation between Short-term memory and MLATE in Tseq was due to the shared variance between 
Short-term memory and Working memory. Lastly, we parse out the effects of Working memory, 
Risk aversion, Math anxiety and Sensation-seeking from the Math score.
39
Before doing so, we briefly examine determinants of early forecasting performance and learning. 
Table 1 shows that MEARLY is not correlated with any cognitive variables, although the correlation 
with Working memory in Tseq is almost significant. MEARLY is better for subjects with lower Risk 
aversion  in Tseq,  and for males in both treatments.  We return to the determinants of early 
performance in the multivariate analysis. Lastly, the extent of learning, MEARLY-MLATE, is positively 
related to Working memory in both treatments but stronger in Tseq. In Tsim, learning is greater for 
subjects with higher Need for cognition and for females.
 Table 1 shows that the 
regression residuals, MATHresid2, are uncorrelated with MLATE in either treatment, which again 
suggests that the correlation between Math and MLATE  in Tseq  was due  to the shared variance 
between Math and Working memory. We reconcile this issue in the multivariate analysis. 
40
                                                 
37  Short-term memory and Math together explain 20% of the variance in Working memory while the 
personality variables explain additional 6 percentage points. The negative effect of Need for cognition could 
be compensation for the fact that Short-term memory or Math to some extent proxy for test-taking 
motivation as they are measured without performance-based incentives. Note that Need for cognition is 
uncorrelated with Working memory itself as well as with how subjects perform on the working memory 
test’s initial equation-solving speed test (see Section 3.1). 
 
38 Working memory explains 17.5% of the variance in Short-term memory, while the personality variables 
explain additional 2.5 percentage points. Math is highly insignificant. The effect of Premeditation is 
negative. The effect of Judgmental confidence is positive for females and negative for males; the interaction 
is significant at p<0.1. The gender dummy is highly insignificant and hence omitted. 
39 Working memory explains 5.5% of the variance in Math, while the personality variables explain additional 
12 percentage points. Short-term memory is highly insignificant. The effect of Sensation-seeking is negative. 
The effects of Risk aversion and Math anxiety are the same as for MATHresid1. The gender dummy is 
highly insignificant and hence omitted. As in the MATHresid1 estimation, Age has a negative effect but is 
not included in the final estimation. 
40 We caution that the learning correlations are informative only to the extent that MEARLY-MLATE is deemed 
suitable for comparing the magnitude of learning across subjects with varying values of MEARLY. We 
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4.3 Multivariate analysis of forecasting performance 
The causality hypothesis proposes that, controlling for the impact of other cognitive, personality 
and demographic variables, working memory should be a stronger determinant of performance in 
Tseq compared to Tsim. To assess the hypothesis, we test for the across-treatment differential in the 
impact of working memory on MLATE in the following model: 
  seqMLATE – 







All variables are differenced across treatments within subject pairs facing identical Ωt forecasting 
sequences.
41
We estimate the model using a censored Tobit estimator (censored normal regression) that permits 
“top-bounded” performance to arise in either Tsim or Tseq within each subject pair.
 
seqMLATE and 
simMLATE are the Nx1 performance vectors (N=62), Χ
seq and Χ
sim
 are the 
NxK matrices of K individual characteristics included in the estimated model, β
seq and β
sim are the 
Kx1 parameter vectors, ε
seq and ε
sim
 are the regression disturbances, and α is the intercept indicating 
any remaining across-treatment performance differential. 
42 Five subjects in 
Tsim and three in Tseq reach MLATE=0, and most of them already have their performance (almost) 
perfectly top-bounded for quite a while before reaching the LATE periods.  The  slight  across-
treatment difference in the extent of top-bounded performance is unlikely to drive  the across-
treatment differential in the impact of working memory (and other variables) since the presented 
results hold regardless of including the top-bounded subjects (i.e., pairs). Furthermore, we show for 
selected models that OLS estimates, while potentially biased due to the censoring issue, yield very 
similar results.
43
All individual characteristics are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance,  so  each 
coefficient estimate is a (partial) average marginal effect on MLATE of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in an individual characteristic. In presenting the models, we gradually expand the set of 
characteristics that are assumed relevant.  Due to the different cognitive and possibly also 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
alternatively examined various proportional learning metrics and learning speed or duration metrics, but 
none of them seemed related to the individual characteristics in an economically meaningful way. 
41 The model thus assumes that the effect of Ωt-complexity on MLATE does not interact with the effect of the 
included individual characteristics. The assumption seems innocuous given our background results. Namely, 
we parameterize a broad set of Ωt-complexity characteristics (variants of those listed in the Appendix) and 
find in a panel estimation that several of these characteristics weakly influence forecasting performance in 
early stages of the forecasting task but not in the LATE periods. 
42 In one case, both subjects in a given pair are top-bounded. We treat this as a no-censoring case with no 
consequences for the reported results. 
43 The OLS estimation might also be viewed as a useful robustness check in that the censored Tobit estimator 
is asymptotic and relies on the assumption of i.i.d. normal disturbances which is seemingly met but difficult 
to test reliably given the small sample size. 
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personality (motivational) requirements of Tsim and Tseq, we a priori permit that not only working 
memory but also other characteristics differ in their impact across treatments. To gain efficiency 
though, estimates are pooled whenever they do not differ across treatments at p<0.1 using a two-tail 
Wald test. As an exception, we use a one-tail  Wald test when testing  for the  across-treatment 
differential in the impact of working memory and short-term memory since we hypothesize that 
their impact is greater in Tseq. 
Table 2 displays the first  set of models  where MLATE  is regressed on the cognitive abilities 
themselves rather than their residuals (see the previous section). Model 1 presents the most bare-
bone test of the causality  hypothesis.  Confirming the correlation results, Working memory 
significantly fosters performance only in Tseq where a one-standard-deviation increase in Working 
memory corresponds to a performance increase of 52%, compared to an increase of 18% in Tsim. 
The across-treatment differential is significant at p<0.1. The insignificant intercept indicates better 
performance in Tsim compared to Tseq, in magnitude matching the insignificant across-treatment 
differential in average MLATE reported in Section 4.1. The intercept generally gets even smaller in 
the remaining models  (including  those  in Tables 3 and 4), confirming  that  the  cognitive load 
treatment manipulation only has a weak average effect on asymptotic performance. 
In Model 2, both higher Working memory and Short-term memory contribute significantly and 
similarly in magnitude to improving performance in Tseq. The size of the Working memory effect is 
slightly reduced compared to Model 1, likely due to the shared variance with Short-term memory. 
Both Working memory and Short-term memory exhibit a significant across-treatment differential at 
p<0.1, suggesting that they both have a causal effect on performance. 
In Model 3 that additionally includes Math, the effects of Working memory and Short-term memory 
remain virtually intact in Tseq, and the across-treatment differential for Working memory becomes 
significant  at  p<0.05.  Math  turns out to significantly foster performance only in Tsim  where, 
controlling for the (now even weaker) impact of Working and Short-term memory, a one-standard-
deviation increase in Math is associated with a 43% increase in performance. The Math across-
treatment differential just misses significance (p=0.126). Hence relaxing the memory load in Tsim 
compared to Tseq seems to transform the forecasting task from a memory-intensive into a number-
intensive one. The finding that Math affects performance in Tsim rather than Tseq contradicts the 
correlation results; the discrepancy most likely arises from the shared variance between Math and 
Working memory which the multivariate analysis takes into account. 
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Controlling for the effect of cognitive abilities, we next examine the effect of personality and 
demographic characteristics, eventually including only those significantly predicting performance.
44
Finally, Model 6 suggests that receiving the windfall bonus further stimulates performance in Tseq. 
The insignificant Windfall effect in Tsim has the opposite sign, and the across-treatment differential 
is significant at p<0.1. Despite the bonus being awarded entirely exogenous to the forecasting task, 
we find in an ordered logit estimation (or alternatively a linear probability model estimation) that 
the bonus in fact went more often to males, subjects with higher Math score and Risk aversion, 
lower Perseverance and Math anxiety, and females with higher Sensation-seeking. We check that 
parsing out these effects from the Windfall score and including only the Windfall residuals, 
WINDresid, in Model 6 leaves the results intact. Also, Windfall does not seem to interact with any 
cognitive, personality and demographic characteristics. 
 
Overall, their effects are much smaller in magnitude compared to those of Working memory and 
Short-term memory in Tseq and Math in Tsim. We first consider Need for cognition since it seems the 
most theoretically relevant personality determinant of performance. In Model 4, higher Need for 
cognition indeed fosters performance. The Math across-treatment differential becomes significant at 
p<0.1 and stays significant in the remaining models. In Model 5, subjects with lower Math anxiety 
perform better, whereas the impact of Need for cognition becomes smaller and insignificant (we 
nevertheless keep the variable for model comparison since excluding it makes no difference for the 
other estimates).  The across-treatment differentials for both Working memory and Short-term 
memory are now significant at p<0.05.  
Finally,  Model 7  represents an OLS counterpart of Model 6.  The OLS estimates  for Working 
memory and Short-term memory in Tseq and Math in Tsim are slightly biased towards zero compared 
to the censored Tobit estimates in Model 6. However, the qualitative conclusions drawn from the 
two alternative estimations are essentially identical. In Model 7, the included regressors together 
explain 43% of between-subject (and across-treatment) variance in forecasting performance. 
Taken together, the richer Models 4-7 confirm and in some cases strengthen (in terms of statistical 
significance) the explanatory power of Working memory and Short-term memory in Tseq and Math 
in Tsim. The effect sizes remain remarkably stable across the models, regardless of which other 
variables are included. In the richest Model 6, one-standard-deviation increases in Working memory 
and  Short-term memory in Tseq  and Math in Tsim  correspond,  ceteris paribus, to performance 
                                                 
44  The remaining personality and demographic variables as well as any interactions and higher-order 
moments are individually and jointly insignificant at conventional significance levels (usually highly 
insignificant), and including them tends to considerably reduce the precision of the reported estimates. 
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increases  of 39%,  40% and 48%, respectively. The  across-treatment differentials for Working 
memory (and Short-term memory) always reach p<0.1 and sometimes p<0.05, so the  causality 
hypothesis receives robust and moderately strong support. In the models presented next, the support 
is even stronger. 
In particular, Table 3 displays a second set of models where MLATE is regressed on the residual 
variation in cognitive abilities. There are three pairs of models, where the left model (e.g., Model 
4a) features WMresid1 and MATHresid1 from which personality traits were parsed out, while the 
right model (e.g., Model 4b) features WMresid2, STMresid2 and MATHresid2 from which their 
shared variance and personality traits were parsed out (see the previous section). The first, second 
and third pairs of models in Table 3 corresponds to Models 4, 5 and 6 in Table 2, respectively, and 
were selected using the same criteria. 
Comparing the corresponding models across the two tables, the effects of working and short-term 
memory are qualitatively very similar. Quantitatively, however, the effect of working memory in 
Tseq now becomes substantially larger in magnitude, especially in the models with WMresid2. In the 
richest Models 6a and 6b, a one-standard-deviation increase in WMresid1 and WMresid2 in Tseq 
corresponds to a performance increase of 43% and 69%, respectively. The effect of STMresid2 in 
Tseq is also larger in magnitude and more significant. In some models, WMresid2 and especially 
STMresid2 become significant even in Tsim, though the effect size is still much smaller compared to 
Tseq. The across-treatment differential for working memory and hence the support for the causality 
hypothesis becomes stronger, always reaching p<0.05 for WMresid1 and p<0.01 for WMresid2. 
The across-treatment differential for STMresid2 is also stronger, always reaching p<0.05. 
Compared to the effect of Math, the effect of MATHresid1 in Tsim is slightly smaller in magnitude 
but still highly significant; the across-treatment differential stays about the same, always reaching 
p<0.1. By contrast, the across-treatment differential for MATHresid2 is highly insignificant; the 
pooled effect is smaller in magnitude though still weakly significant. Need for cognition is a strong 
positive predictor of performance only  in  Model 4a.  In the remaining models, we include the 
variable whenever it just misses p<0.1, but we omit it from the richer models with WMresid2 where 
it becomes  highly insignificant  and  hinders  efficiency.  Math anxiety now has a slightly  larger 
negative effect on performance, being always significant at p<0.05 or better. The windfall bonus 
now has a weaker positive effect on performance in Tseq where it just misses p<0.1. We nevertheless 
include the variable for comparison with the richest models in Table 2, but here we use WINDresid 
which predicts performance slightly better than Windfall itself. Lastly, the results of the richest 
censored Tobit Model 6b are confirmed in the counterpart OLS Model 7b, which further shows that 
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the included regressors together explain 40% of between-subject (and across-treatment) variance in 
forecasting performance. 
The last set of models in Table 4  attempts to additionally control for the influence of prior 
forecasting expertise. We have shown that especially in Tsim, MEARLY  and MLATE  correlate 
noticeably stronger with each other than either of them separately correlates with individual 
characteristics. Hence both MEARLY  and MLATE  might be influenced by unobserved “intrinsic 
forecasting ability”, and not taking this into account might bias the conclusions about the impact of 
the measured characteristics. As a precaution against such a possibility, we create a proxy for 
intrinsic forecasting ability and include it in the MLATE estimation. An efficient way to create the 
proxy is to extract it from MEARLY performance which is based on the same segment of the Ωt 
forecasting  sequence  as  is  MLATE.  Our proxy is therefore the residual variance in MEARLY  that 
remains after parsing out theoretically and statistically relevant individual characteristics. In that 
way, the effect of the proxy on MLATE will not reflect the impact of those characteristics, so they 
should retain their independent influence on MLATE if any. 
We in fact create two proxies. EARLYresid1 are the residuals extracted from a OLS regression of 
MEARLY on cognitive abilities (of which only Math in Tsim significantly fosters MEARLY) as well as 
statistically significant personality and demographic characteristics (namely, MEARLY is better at 
p<0.1  for males and for subjects with lower Sensation-seeking in Tsim).  On the other hand, 
EARLYresid2  are the residuals from a OLS regression on cognitive abilities  only, of which 
Working memory in Tseq and Math in Tsim significantly improve performance.
45
Comparing the corresponding models across the two tables, the effects of working memory and 
short-term memory are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. Also, there are only minor 
 In Table 4, the 
models are again arranged in pairs, where the left model (e.g., Model 4c) includes EARLYresid1 
while the right model (e.g., Model 4d) includes EARLYresid2. All models  feature  WMresid2, 
STMresid2 and MATHresid2 (see the previous section). Hence the first, second and third pairs of 
models in Table 4 corresponds to Models 4b, 5b and 6b in Table 3, respectively, and were selected 
using the same criteria. 
                                                 
45 MEARLY performance is not top-bounded for any subject, permitting the use of OLS. In order to retain the 
richest possible model, we use the measured cognitive abilities rather than their residuals, and we do not 
allow parameters to be pooled across treatments. The MEARLY estimation is conducted in the paired manner as 
for MLATE. Thus including EARLYredis1 or EARLYresid2 in the MLATE estimation assumes that their impact 
does not differ across treatments. The assumption seems empirically warranted but is hard to test due to the 
considerable loss of efficiency when the MEARLY estimation is alternatively conducted in an unpaired manner. 
The negative impact of Sensation-seeking is reflected in Models 5c and 6c where the variable has a positive 
significant impact in Tsim. This “compensation” effect is of secondary importance and thus is not reported in 
Table 4. 
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quantitative differences between the paired models in Table 4. The across-treatment differential for 
WMresid2 is with one exception significant at p<0.01, while the differential for STMresid2 always 
reaches p<0.05. The pooled effect of MATHresid2 becomes more significant but stays about the 
same in magnitude. Need for cognition again fosters performance only in the simpler Models 4c and 
4d but it becomes highly insignificant in the richer models from which it is omitted. The negative 
effect of Math anxiety on performance stays the same and highly significant. As in Model 6b, 
windfall bonus has a weak positive effect on performance in Tseq where it just misses p<0.1. We 
again include the variable for model comparison and use WINDresid which predicts performance 
slightly better than Windfall itself. 
The main novel insight from the models in Table 4 is that intrinsic forecasting ability is a strong 
positive predictor of performance.  The effect of EARLYresid1  is always slightly smaller  in 
magnitude compared to the effect of EARLYresid2, most likely due to parsing out the personality 
and demographic characteristics from the former.  The OLS Model 7d, besides confirming the 
results of the counterpart censored Tobit Model  6d, shows that including EARLYresid2 in the 
estimation raises the explained share of between-subject (and across-treatment) variance  in 
performance to 57% (compared to 40% in Model 6b). 
5. Conclusion 
Using a memory-intensive time-series forecasting task, we identify the causal effect of working 
memory  and short-term memory on forecasting performance. The higher memory load in  the 
sequential presentation treatment “activates” subjects’ working and short-term memory constraints. 
The constraints become irrelevant in the less memory-intensive simultaneous presentation treatment 
where the explanatory power shifts to basic arithmetic abilities. By removing the shared variance 
between working and short-term memory, we show that their causal effects are independent of each 
other, and in turn that the causality of working memory likely reflects individual heterogeneity in 
the capacity to control attention. Since this capacity is a strong and reliable predictor of behavior in 
a wide range of psychology tasks requiring controlled information processing, our results suggest 
that the capacity might also influence decision quality in cognitively complex economic settings. 
Naturally, the predictive power of the capacity might vary, for instance, with task complexity, 
educational level, and over the life cycle, as seems to be the case for broader measures of general 
intelligence (Almlund et al., 2011). 
Exploring the role of theoretically relevant personality traits, we find that forecasting performance 
is better for subjects with lower math anxiety and, to a weaker extent, higher intrinsic motivation. 
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Further exploring the role of motivational factors, a large windfall financial bonus won prior to the 
forecasting task fosters performance in the sequential presentation treatment. Nevertheless, merely 
controlling for the impact of personality and motivational factors constitutes only an initial step in 
examining their interaction with cognitive abilities, and, more generally, in studying the multitude 
of structural relationships that cognitive production likely entails. Below we discuss some of the 
relationships and how we plan to address them in the forecasting setting, with the prerequisite of 
having established the causality of working and short-term memory. 
To start with, the channels behind the causal effect of cognitive abilities might be numerous. In our 
setting, for example, working memory might influence not only subjects’ ability to effectively 
combine forecast-relevant information  but also the nature of their forecasting strategies (e.g., 
Barrick and Spilker, 2003; Libby and Luft, 1993; strategies might also be affected by the memory 
load manipulation itself). In the Appendix, we make casual observations regarding the importance 
of the strategy channel. Psychologists have further argued that not only the objective cognitive 
abilities but also their self-perception and confidence in them (self-efficacy) may influence behavior 
(e.g., Bandura and Locke, 2003). One way of exploring the confidence channel in our forecasting 
setting  (using a larger data set) is to interpret subjects’ bets as a measure of confidence in 
forecasting abilities. After removing the effect of personality traits such as risk aversion and ex ante 
judgmental confidence from the bets, one can examine whether this measure of confidence fosters 
performance beyond the direct effect of forecasting abilities themselves, and how the confidence 
depends on subjects’ cognitive and personality characteristics. 
One of economically relevant relationships in cognitive production is the degree of substitutability 
among cognitive abilities varying in task specificity. We examined the predictive power of three 
cognitive abilities varying from domain-general (working memory) to more task-specific (short-
term memory and especially basic arithmetic  abilities).  We also saw  their  predictive power to 
persist even after subjects extensively acquired task-specific cognitive ability in the form of on-task 
experience. This is in line with evidence suggesting that various forms of on-task experience do not 
harm the predictive power of working memory (Engle and Kane, 2004). Nevertheless, we did not 
explicitly consider the role of task-specific cognitive ability in the form of prior forecasting 
expertise (or domain knowledge), although we did create a proxy for it based on early forecasting 
performance. There exists only preliminary evidence regarding the interplay between prior expertise 
and general cognitive abilities in economic settings (Hambrick and Engle, 2003). As an initial step, 
Wittmann and Süß (1999) document that both domain knowledge and working memory correlate 
positively with performance in a simulated physical production task. Closer to our setting, Ghosh 
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and Whitecotton (1997) find that higher perceptual abilities are associated with better performance 
in a company earnings prediction task, and that this effect is overcome neither by prior expertise of 
professional financial analysts nor by provision of a decision aid.
46
Arguably, however, only after establishing the causal effect of general cognitive abilities can one 
credibly assess their substitutability with prior expertise. Our forecasting task lends itself to 
examining that substitutability since it naturally extends to a real-world setting. Namely, one could 
adapt the presently abstract task into a financially framed version, for instance by interpreting the 
forecasted variable Ωt as a commodity price following our (or similar) seasonal process, and Bt as 
an economically relevant, perfectly  predictable state variable linearly related to Ωt.  Using the 
sequential and simultaneous  presentation treatments, one could then challenge inexperienced 
forecasters (students) and experienced forecasters (e.g., commodity traders) with the framed and 
unframed versions of the task. The resulting 2x2x2 between-subjects design would shed further 
light on the above established causality of working and short-term  memory and permit direct 
assessment of their substitutability with prior expertise. 
 
Leaving the confines of cognitive abilities and getting to the heart of cognitive production, one 
naturally turns to the interplay between cognitive ability and cognitive effort. Evidence from the 
working memory literature is suggestive of a limited degree of ability-effort substitutability. In tasks 
where working memory is a strong predictor of performance, effort latencies (inferred from 
response times, pupil dilation, fMRI data, etc.) do not vary across people with different working 
memory, while effort latencies tend to increase relatively uniformly with higher financial incentives 
and task complexity (e.g., Heitz et al., 2008). Awasthi and Pratt  (1990) provide further 
circumstantial evidence of limited ability-effort substitutability, in that piece-rate (as compared to 
flat-wage) financial incentives yield better judgmental performance only for individuals with higher 
perceptual  abilities  while effort duration increases uniformly regardless of the abilities.  These 
observations suggest that, even if financial incentives and personality (motivational) traits 
sufficiently induce effort, both financial and cognitive resources might be wasted for people lacking 
cognitive abilities to perform cognitively demanding tasks.  This basic prediction,  expressed in 
Camerer and Hogarth’s (1999) capital-labor-production framework and in various modifications by 
others,
47 seems to have remained empirically unexplored.
48
                                                 
46 The company earnings prediction literature generally provides inconclusive evidence regarding the role of 
prior expertise, both in the lab and the field (e.g., Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Libby et al., 2002). 
  
47 See, e.g., Almlund et al. (2011), Awasthi and Pratt (1990), Conlisk (1980), Libby and Lipe (1992), Libby 
and Luft (1993), Segal (2008), and Wilcox (1993). 
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A potential explanation is that cognitively more constrained individuals are less aware of their 
“objective” cognitive abilities (e.g., Critcher and Dunning, 2009; Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Indeed, the 
working memory literature suggests that people with lower working memory relying predominantly 
on automated processing possess noisier estimates of their abilities, compared to people with higher 
working memory relying mostly on controlled processing (e.g., Feldman-Barrett et al., 2004). One 
way of explicitly exploring this issue is to examine whether and which people are willing to pay for 
the relaxation of their cognitive constraints. In the forecasting setting, imagine that subjects start 
forecasting in the more memory-intensive sequential presentation treatment, but can pay (at the start 
of each period) for switching to the less memory-intensive simultaneous presentation treatment. 
Subjects could therefore choose to purchase “external” memory. Figure 1 illustrates that switching 
to the simultaneous presentation treatment does not guarantee perfect performance but it does 
improve performance and learning progress on average. Subjects of course do not know this and 
their switching decisions would presumably reflect their expectation that the net (long-run) return to 
switching is positive. Thus similar to bets, switching behavior yields a decision-relevant and 
incentive-compatible indicator of subjects’ estimates of their forecasting abilities, which can in turn 
be linked to the measured cognitive and personality characteristics and forecasting performance. 
One may further want to examine the effect of varying the cost of switching. 
A different perspective on ability-effort substitutability may be gained by focusing on the (reduced-
form)  interaction  among  cognitive  abilities, personality traits  and  financial incentives.  As 
mentioned in Section 1,  establishing the causality of cognitive abilities is a prerequisite for 
addressing issues relevant for the design of efficient incentive schemes, such as how people behave 
under different incentive levels and schemes conditional on their abilities (and traits), and how they 
self-select into the schemes  based on their abilities  (and traits).  Initial  experimental  evidence 
suggests a positive interaction of incentives and abilities in fostering performance. In an accounting 
task, Awasthi and Pratt (1990) find that incentives (rewarding correct choice) improve judgmental 
performance compared to flat-wage pay only for subjects with high perceptual abilities. Similarly, 
Palacios-Huerta (2003) reports that increasing  incentives (piece-rate and tournament) improves 
performance in a Monty Hall Three Door task only for subjects with superior schooling outcomes. 
Nevertheless, this evidence is purely correlational and does not enable one to condition on cognitive 
abilities.  By contrast, we can credibly study incentive variation in the forecasting task  while 
                                                                                                                                                                  
48 Indirect evidence from meta-studies and empirical surveys indicates that incentive effects depend in a 
complicated fashion on the nature of cognitive tasks (e.g., Bonner et al., 2000; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; 
Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, 2003; Jenkins et al., 1998). Promising initial steps towards understanding 
incentive effects have also been made in neurobiology (e.g., Gold and Shadlen, 2001) and neuroeconomics 
(e.g., Camerer et al., 2005). 
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conditioning on working memory and short-term memory. We could  also  interact incentive 
variation with the cognitive load variation, interpreting the simultaneous and sequential presentation 
treatments as less and more demanding work settings, respectively. 
One could further explore the welfare (performance) implications of implementing the forecasting 
task under various incentive schemes – say, the presently used piece-rate scheme, a quota scheme, a 
tournament scheme and a flat-wage scheme. Due to their varying returns to cognitive abilities and 
effort as well as varying degree of competitiveness, the incentive schemes likely differ in the extent 
to which abilities and traits predict performance. One could examine whether financial incentives 
can be utilized efficiently by ex ante  assigning employees to incentives schemes which  best 
correspond to their observed (measured) abilities and traits. A natural extension is to examine how 
people self-select on their abilities and traits into the incentive schemes and whether this 
endogenous sorting is efficient compared to the exogenous assignment. A recent experimental 
literature has shown that endogenous sorting can be efficient (in terms of output) and seems driven 
mainly by productivity sorting and partly by personality traits such as risk attitudes (e.g., Dohmen 
and Falk, 2011; Cadsby et al., 2007). Again, however, the literature has not attended systematically 
to cognitive and personality determinants of performance and sorting, and especially to the issue of 
causality. 
To conclude, economists widely believe that, absent strategic considerations such as agency 
problems, financial incentives represent a dominant and effective stimulator of human productive 
activities.  In production settings that are cognitively demanding, however, the effectiveness of 
financial incentives may be moderated by individual cognitive abilities and personality traits. We 
provide initial evidence from an economic setting that the effectiveness of even strong financial 
incentives may be moderated by cognitive abilities in a causal fashion. In line with the correlational 
evidence reviewed in Section 1, our findings illustrate the need to attend to cognitive constraints, 
besides personality and preference-based factors, when interpreting observed (variance of) behavior 
in cognitively demanding lab and field economic environments. 
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Table 1: Correlations between forecasting performance and cognitive, personality and 
demographic variables in Tsim and Tseq 
 
   
Note: The variables are defined in Section 4. The table displays Spearman rank correlations with p-
values in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance of the estimates at  p<0.1, p<0.05 and 
p<0.01, respectively. 
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Note: Forecasting performance is MLATE. The regressors are defined in Section 4. Observations = 124, 62 in Tsim and 62 in Tseq. Displayed are 
average marginal effects of censored normal estimates with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses; the last model presents 
OLS estimates. *,**, and *** indicate significance of estimates as well as their across-treatment differentials (underneath the standard errors) at 
p<0.1, p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively, using a two-tail Wald test. As an exception, the across-treatment differentials for Working memory and 
Short-term memory are compared using a one-tail Wald test. The included regressors are always jointly highly significant. 
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Note: See notes for Table 2. 
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Note: See notes for Table 2. 
   
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 06443 
 
Figure 1: Forecasting performance of the average and the 10
th and 90
th percentile subjects in each treatment 
 
 
Note: Msim,t and Mseq,t denote the average Mi,t in Tsim and Tseq, respectively. 10Msim,t and 10Mseq,t denote the respective 10
th percentiles of 
Mi,t. 90Msim,t and 90Mseq,t denote the respective 90
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APPENDIX: Supplementary design and implementation details 
Forecasting sequences and strategies 
In the Ωt sequences, only the ηt streams vary across subjects. Their first 75 periods are generated 
randomly (thereafter,  the  ηt  streams repeat a previous segment due to the  matching of the 
EARLY and LATE periods as well as the eight periods preceding them), subject to the restriction 
that they are representative in terms of Ωt-complexity, i.e., the complexity of extracting the 
seasonal pattern. 
In particular, the theoretically most important complexity characteristic is the frequency of 
events with which subjects encounter the full range of the γs+ηt distributions, conditional on γs, 
since only after observing the range can one determine γs with certainty. The arguably most 
salient aspect of this complexity characteristic is the frequency of events with which the range of 
a given γs+ηt distribution, conditional on γs, can be inferred from successive seasonal realizations 
of Ωt and Bt that appear on the screen in a given period. To operationalize this complexity 
characteristic, all the 75-period ηt streams contain six such events (summed across seasons), six 
being approximately the sample mean of the frequency of the events for randomly generated 75-
period ηt streams. 
Another complexity characteristic common to all of the selected 75-period ηt streams is that their 
sample mean does not significantly differ from  zero (at  p<0.01 using  the  t-test). Also, the 
sampling variance of the 75-period ηt streams measured in period 45 varies between 27 and 37. 
These are approximately the 10
th  and 90
th  percentiles,  respectively, of the corresponding 
sampling variance distribution for randomly generated 75-period ηt streams. This condition is to 
ensure that the ηt streams are not too improbable in the early stages of the task where most 
learning is expected to occur. 
The seemingly most efficient forecasting strategy would first focus on detecting the length of the 
seasonal pattern, perhaps by experimenting with various lengths, and then on accumulating 
season-specific information for each of the γs+ηt distributions, conditional on γs, to be able to 
extract the means of the distributions, γs. Nevertheless, a debriefing questionnaire suggests that 
most subjects relied on less efficient (and likely more memory-intensive) forecasting strategies, 
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attending to successive Ωt-Bt values in an attempt to create a long enough “virtual” sequence of 
γs+ηt values that would allow them to gradually recognize the seasonal pattern. The debriefing 
questionnaire also offers suggestive evidence that subjects with higher working memory used 
more efficient forecasting strategies resembling the efficient strategy described above. This 
raises the possibility of an indirect “ability-strategy-performance” channel but we do not address 
the  (relative)  importance of the channel  due to the rather casual evidence on forecasting 
strategies. 
Experimental instructions 
In the paper instructions preceding the computerized forecasting task, subjects observe examples 
of seasonal patterns of various lengths and are advised to attend to the observed past values of 
Ωt-Bt = γs+ηt to be able to gradually extract the seasonal parameters, γs. Furthermore, before 
proceeding to the forecasting task, subjects are required to complete computerized training 
screens that test  their understanding of how Ωt  is collectively determined by its three 
components. However, subjects are told neither how many nor which past values of Ωt-Bt to 
attend to.  
The detailed task-property feedback in the instructions is meant to further suppress the activation 
of simplifying heuristics and to instead encourage the use of memory-intensive, financially 
rewarding forecasting strategies described earlier. The detailed, example-oriented nature of the 
instructions is further meant to reduce the likelihood that subjects impute their own, possibly 
erroneous, forecasting context based on their past experience with solving “similar” forecasting 
problems (in the sense of Harrison and List, 2004). 
Timing of forecasting screens 
In Tsim, subjects observe the two parallel (Bt+1,…,Bt-7) and (Ωt,…,Ωt-7) screens for 15 seconds 
each. In Tseq, subjects observe the (Bt+1,…,Bt-7) screen for 10 seconds and subsequently the 
(Ωt,…,Ωt-7) screen for 15 seconds. While this arrangement does not offer the same total time 
across treatments for observing the forecast-relevant information, it does offer the same 
“processing” time of 15 seconds for combining the forecast-relevant information, be it visually in 
Tsim or virtually in Tseq. As regards the remaining screens, the feedback screen appears for 5 
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seconds, and the two screens where subjects place their forecasts and bets are not time-
constrained, allowing subjects to go along the forecasting task at their own pace. 
Feedback 
In each period t, subjects are told by how much their forecast, Ft+1, is above or below Ωt+1. They 
are repeatedly reminded in the instructions that ηt+1 is unpredictable, and they are guided through 
the implications of the presence of ηt+1 for their interpretation of the observed “noisy” forecast 
errors, Ωt+1-Ft+1. Judging from responses in a debriefing questionnaire, the instructions were 
successful in achieving subjects’ understanding of the role and implications of ηt, something that 
people apparently have trouble comprehending in forecasting experiments where the 
implications of randomness are (often purposefully) not clarified (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1993; Hey, 
1994; Maines and Hand, 1996; Stevens and Williams, 2004). 
Providing only current-period forecast errors rather than a sequence of past forecast errors is 
meant to limit the possibility that subjects apply a simplifying feedback-tracking (exponential 
smoothing) forecasting heuristic often reported in the forecasting literature (e.g., Hey, 1994). 
We nevertheless note the potential caveat that, due to subjects’ varying desire to know more 
about their forecasting performance progress, not providing more extensive visual feedback 
might lead to subjects allocating differential amounts of their scarce memory resources to 
keeping track of how well they are doing, which might in turn dilute the power of working and 
short-term memory in explaining forecasting performance per se. Arguably, however, providing 
current-period feedback is still better than providing none (e.g., Hey, 1994). Throughout the task, 
subjects are not provided with earnings feedback (beyond what they can infer from their forecast 
errors) in order to limit the potential impact of wealth accumulation on forecasting performance. 
Betting 
To make the betting scheme conceptually transparent, the paper instructions explain in detail that 
not only forecasting accuracy pays, but also that the more accurately subjects forecast on 
average, the more profitable betting above 50 ECU becomes on average. As mentioned above, 
subjects are also guided through the implication of the presence of ηt+1 for the interpretation of 
their “noisy” forecast errors, Ft+1-Ωt+1. One of the computerized training screens preceding the 
forecasting task tests subjects’ understanding of the payoff function. A full payoff table is 
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provided to subjects but they are reminded that it is far more important to understand the simple 
logic of how to bet profitably. The instructions also provide subjects with basic context for why 
they are required to bet on their forecasts in order to make it less likely that subjects provide their 
own, possibly misleading betting context. 
Subject pool and recruitment 
Most subjects were recruited from the University of Economics and Czech Technical University 
in Prague. Czech Technical University is a relatively non-selective university admitting 
technically-oriented students with heterogeneous educational background, while the University 
of Economics is more selective university predominantly offering education in economics, 
management and accounting. We do not detect any differences in forecasting  performance 
related to subjects’ field of study, though the sample sizes involved in the comparisons are too 
small to draw any firm conclusions. 
The experiment was run in eleven sessions. Due to concerns that subjects in successive 
experimental sessions might share information relevant for performing well in the forecasting 
task as well as some of the cognitive tests, every attempt was made to ensure that successive 
sessions overlapped or were sufficiently apart from each other, or that subjects in adjacent, non-
overlapping sessions were recruited from different universities or university campuses. In 
retrospect, subjects’ behavior in the experiment – especially the lack of “perfect” performance in 
early stages of the forecasting task – suggests little or no degree of social learning. 
A total of 136 subjects completed the experiment, 12 of which were excluded from the analysis. 
Namely, eight subjects did not meet requirements of the working memory test (their performance 
on the equation-solving part of the test fell below the required 85% success rate), and four failed 
to follow our reminder not to make any notes during the forecasting task itself. In the last couple 
of sessions, we replaced these 12 subjects by new ones in order to obtain the final set of 62 
subject pairs facing identical Ωt sequences across treatment. 
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